The paper proposes an analysis of liquid democracy (or delegable proxy voting) from the perspective of binary aggregation and of binary diffusion models. We show how proxy voting can be embedded into the framework of binary aggregation with abstentions, allowing known results about the latter to apply to the former. We then turn to an analysis of Boolean DeGroot processes, a special case of the DeGroot stochastic model of opinion diffusion, where each agent holds binary opinions and has a unique influencer. We establish the convergence conditions of such opinion dynamics, which in turn sheds novel light on the analysis of delegable proxy. The study is a first attempt to provide theoretical foundations to liquid democracy. Our analysis also leads to recommendations on how to modify the system to make it better behaved with respect to the handling of delegation cycles and of inconsistent majorities.
Introduction
Liquid democracy is a form of democratic decision-making considered to stand between direct and representative democracy. It has been used, advocated and popularized by local and even national parties (e.g., Demoex 1 in Sweden, and Piratenpartei 2 in Germany) to coordinate the behavior of party representatives in assemblies, as well as campaigns (e.g., Make Your Laws 3 in the US)). At its heart is voting via a delegable proxy, also called transitive proxy. For each issue submitted to vote, each agent can either cast its own vote, or it can delegate its vote to another agent-a proxy-and that agent can delegate in turn to yet another agent and so on. This differentiates liquid democracy from standard proxy voting [22, 25] , where proxies cannot delegate their vote further. Finally, the agents that decided not to delegate their votes cast their ballots (e.g., under majority rule). But their votes now carry as weight the number of all agents that entrusted them with their vote.
Scientific context and contribution Analyses of standard (non-delegable) proxy voting from a social choice-theoretic perspective-specifically through the theory of spatial voting-have been put forth in [1] and [15] . Delegable proxy has nor, to the best of our knowledge, been object of study so far, with the notable exception of [5] which focuses on algorithmic aspects of a variant of liquid democracy (which the authors refer to as viscous democracy).
The objective of the paper is to provide a first analysis, via formal methods, of the liquid democracy voting system. This, we hope, should point to a number of future lines of research and stimulate further investigations into this and related systems.
Outline The paper starts in Section 2 by introducing some preliminaries on the theory of binary aggregation, which is the framework of reference for this study. It is then structured in two parts. The first part (Sections 3) studies voting in liquid democracy from the point of view of the delegation of voting power: we study delegable proxy aggregators using the machinery of binary and judgment aggregation. This allows us to shed novel light on the issues involved in the liquid democracy system, in particular: the issue of circular delegation, and the issue of individual irrationality when voting on logically interdependent issues. The second part (Sections 4 and 5) studies voting in liquid democracy as a very specific type of opinion formation on networks, whereby delegation is rather interpreted as the willingness to copy the vote of a trustee. We show that this perspective provides some interesting insights on how to address the above mentioned issues of circular delegations and individual irrationality. Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines some on-going lines of research.
Binary Aggregation with Abstention
The formalism of choice for this paper is binary aggregation [12] with abstention. 4 This preliminary section is devoted to its introduction.
Opinions and Opinion Profiles
A binary aggregation structure (BA structure) is a tuple A = N, P, γ where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a non-empty finite set individuals s.t. |N | = n ∈ N;
• P = {p 1 , . . . , p m } is a non-empty finite set of issues (|P| = m ∈ N), each represented by a propositional atom;
• γ ∈ L is an (integrity) constraint, where L is the propositional language constructed by closing P under a functionally complete set of Boolean connectives (e.g., {¬, ∧}).
An opinion function O is an assignment of truth values to the set of issues P. Thus, O(p) = 0 (respectively, O(p) = 1) indicates that opinion O rejects (respectively, accepts) the issue p. Syntactically, the two opinions correspond to the truth of the literals p or ¬p. For p ∈ P we write ±p to denote one element from {p, ¬p}, and ±P to denote p∈P {p, ¬p}, which we will refer to as the agenda of A. Allowing abstention in the framework of binary aggregation amounts to considering incomplete opinions: an incomplete opinion is a partial function from P to {0, 1}. We will study it as a function O : P → {0, 1, * } thereby explicitly denoting the undetermined value corresponding to abstention.
We say that the incomplete opinion of an agent i is consistent if the set of formulas {p | O i (p) = 1} ∪ {¬p | O i (p) = 0} ∪ {γ} is satisfiable. That is, the integrity constraint is consistent with i's opinion on the issues she does not abstain about. We say it is closed if whenever {p | O i (p) = 1} ∪ {¬p | O i (p) = 0} ∪ {γ} logically implies p (respectively, ¬p) then O i (p) = 1 (respectively, O i (p) = 0). That is, individual opinions are closed under logical consequence or, in other words, agents cannot abstain on issues whose acceptance or rejection is dictated by their expressed opinions on other issues. The set of incomplete opinions is denoted O * and the set of consistent and closed incomplete opinions O * c . As the latter are the opinions we are interested in, we will often refer to them simply as individual opinions.
An opinion profile O = (O 1 , . . . , O n ) records the opinion, on the given set of issues, of every individual in N . Given a profile O the i th projection O is denoted O i (i.e., the opinion of agent i in profile O). Let us introduce some more notation. We also denote by O(p) = {i ∈ N | O i (p) = 1} the set of agents accepting issue p in profile O, by O(¬p) = {i ∈ N | O i (p) = 0} and by O(±p) = O(p) ∪ O(¬p) the set of non-abstaining agents. We write O = −i O to denote that the two profiles O and O are identical, except for possibly the opinion of i. 
Aggregators
We will refer to this rule simply as 'majority'. Majority can be thought of as a quota rule. In general, quota rules in binary aggregation with abstention are of the form: accept when the proportion of non-abstaining individuals accepting is above the acceptance-quota, reject when the proportion of non-abstaining individuals is above the rejection-quota, and abstain otherwise:
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Definition 1 (Quota rules). Let A be an aggregation structure. A quota rule (for A) is defined as follows, for any issue p ∈ P, and any opinion profile
where for x ∈ {0, 1}, q x is a function q x : P → (0, 1] ⊂ Q assigning a rational number to each issue, and such that, for each p ∈ P:
A quota rule is called:
The definition excludes trivial quota. 8 It should also be clear that, by (3) the above defines an aggregator of type (O * c ) N → O * as desired. 9 Notice also that if the rule is symmetric, then (3) forces q x > 1 2 . Example 1. The majority rule (1) is a uniform and symmetric quota rule where q 1 and q 0 are set to meet the equation
There are several ways to think of quota rules in the presence of abstentions. Instead of a quota being a proportion of non-abstaining agents, one could for instance define rules with absolute quotas instead: accept when at least n agents accept, independently of how many agents do not abstain. In practice, voting rules with abstention are often a combination of those two ideas: accept an issue if a big enough proportion of the population does not abstain, and if a big enough proportion of those accept it. 6 The definition uses the ceiling function x denoting the smallest integer larger than x. 7 The definition of symmetric rule could be relaxed somewhat to: for all p ∈ P, and all O ∈ O * , q 1 (p)|O(±p)| = q 0 (p)|O(±p)| .
8 Those are quotas with value 0 (always met) or > 1 (never met). Restricting to non-trivial quota is not essential but simplifies our exposition.
9 What needs to be avoided here is that both the acceptance and rejection quota are set so low as to make the rule output both the acceptance and the rejection of a given issue
, for any issue p and profile O. This is achieved by setting the quota
2|N | . More precisely one should therefore consider maj as a class of quota rules yielding the same collective opinions.
Example 2. The uniform and symmetric unanimity rule is defined by setting q 1 = q 0 = 1. A natural uniform but asymmetric variant of unanimity can be obtained by setting q 1 = 1 and q 0 = 1 |N | . Let us finally note an important difference between quota rules in binary aggregation with abstentions vs. without abstentions. In a framework without abstentions quota rules are normally defined by a unique acceptance quota q 1 , the rejection quota being uniquely determined as q 0 = 1−q 1 . As a consequence, the majority rule, when |N | is odd, is the only unbiased quota rule in the standard framework. This is no longer the case when abstentions are considered. A novel characterization of the majority rule will be given in Section 2.5.
Agenda conditions
Definition 2 (simple/evenly negatable agenda). An agenda ±P is said to be simple if there exists no set X ⊆ ±P such that: |X| ≥ 3, and X is minimally γ-inconsistent, that is:
• X is inconsistent with γ
• For all Y ⊂ X, Y is consistent with γ (or, γ-consistent).
An agenda is said to be evenly negatable if there exists a minimal γ-inconsistent set X ⊆ ±P such that for a set Y ⊆ X of even size, X\Y ∪ {¬p | p ∈ Y } is γ-consistent. It is said to be path-connected if there exists p 1 , . . . , p n ∈ ±P such that p 1 |= c p 2 , . . . , p n−1 |= x p n where p i |= c p i+1 (conditional entailment) denotes that there exists X ⊆ ±P, which is γ-consistent with both p i and ¬p i+1 , and such that {p} ∪ X ∪ {γ} |= p i+1 .
We refer the reader to [16, Ch. 2] for a detailed exposition of the above conditions. We provide just a simple illustrative example.
Example 3. Let P = {p, q, r} and let γ = (p ∧ q) → r. ±P is not simple. The set {p, q, ¬r} ⊆ ±P is inconsistent with γ, but none of its subsets is.
Properties of aggregators
We start by recalling some well-known properties of aggregators from the judgment aggregation literature, adapted to the setting with abstention:
* is said to be:
unanimous iff for all p ∈ P, for all profiles O and all x ∈ {0, 1,
I.e., if everybody agrees on a value, that value is the collective value.
anonymous iff for any bijection µ :
, . . . , O µ(n) . I.e., permuting opinions among individuals does not affect the output of the aggregator. p-dictatorial iff there exists i ∈ N (the p-dictator) s.t. for any profile O, and all x ∈ {0, 1}, O i (p) = x iff F (O)(p) = x. I.e., there exists an agent whose definite opinion determines the group's definite opinion on p. If F is p-dictatorial, with the same dictator on all issues p ∈ P, then it is called dictatorial.
p-oligarchic iff there exists C ⊆ N (the p-oligarchs) s.t. C = ∅ and for any profile O, and any value x ∈ {0, 1},
I.e., there exists a group of agents whose definite opinions always determine the group's definite opinion on p. If F is p-oligarchic, with the same oligarchs on all issues p ∈ P, then it is called oligarchic.
monotonic iff, for all p ∈ P and all i ∈ N : for any profiles
I.e., increasing support for a definite collective opinion does not change that collective opinion.
independent iff, for all p ∈ P, for any profiles
systematic iff it is neutral and independent. I.e., the collective opinion on issue p depends only on the individual opinions on this issue.
responsive iff for all p ∈ P, there exist profiles O, O such that F (O)(p) = 1 and F (O )(p) = 0. I.e., the rule allows for an issue to be accepted for some profile, and rejected for some other.
unbiased iff for all p ∈ P, for any profiles
, reversing all and only individual opinions on an issue p (from acceptance to rejection and from rejection to acceptance) results in reversing the collective opinion on p.
rational iff for any profile O, F (O) is consistent and closed. I.e., the aggregator preserves the constraints on individual opinions.
Example 4. It is well-known that majority is not rational in general. The standard example is provided by the so-called discursive dilemma, represented by the BA structure {1, 2, 3} , {p, q, r} , r ↔ (p ∧ q) . The profile consisting of
Finally, let us defined also the following property. The undecisiveness of an aggregator F on issue p for a given aggregation structure is defined as the number of profiles which result in collective abstention on p:
2. 
May's theorem [21] famously shows that for preference aggregation, the majority rule is in fact the only aggregator satisfying a specific bundle of desirable properties. A corresponding characterization of the majority rule is given in judgment aggregation without abstention: when the agenda is simple, the majority rule is the only aggregator which is rational, anonymous, monotonic and unbiased [16, Th. 3.2] . We give below a novel characterization theorem, which takes into account the possibility of abstention (both at the individual and at the collective level). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result of this kind in the literature on judgment and binary aggregation with abstention.
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let F be a uniform and symmetric quota rule for a given A. The following holds:
Proof. The claim is proven by the following series of equivalent statements. (a) A uniform and symmetric quota rule F has quota such that 
That is, quota rule (class of quota rules) corresponding to majority (Example 1) is precisely the rule that minimizes undecisiveness.
We can now state and prove the characterization result: O(p ± ) ≥ q 1 . The argument for q 0 is identical. Claims 2 & 3 follow straightforwardly from the definitions of uniform quota rule (Definition 1) and of neutrality (Definition 3) and, respectively, from the definitions of symmetric quota rules (Definition 1) and of unbiasedness (Definition 3) .
Claim 4 Left-to-right. Recall that maj is defined by quota
. It is clear that maj is uniform and symmetric. The claim then follows by Lemma 1. Right-to-left. By Lemma 1 if an aggregator minimizes undecisiveness then its quota are set as
By the above theorem and Fact 1, it follows that, on simple agendas, majority is the only rational aggregator which is also responsive, anonymous, systematic and monotonic.
Impossibility in Binary Aggregation with Abstentions
The following is a well-know impossibility result concerning binary aggregation with abstentions: Theorem 2 ( [9, 8] ). Let A be a BA structure whose agenda is path connected and evenly negatable. Then if an aggregator F : (O * c ) N → O * is independent, unanimous and collectively rational, then it is oligarchic.
We will use this result to illustrate how impossibility results from binary aggregation with abstentions apply to delegable proxy voting.
Liquid Democracy as Binary Aggregation
In this section we provide an analysis of liquid democracy by embedding it in the theory of binary aggregation with abstentions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at providing an analysis of liquid democracy using social-choice theoretic tools, with the possible exception of [14] .
In what follows we will normally refer to delegable proxy voting/aggregation simply as proxy voting/aggragation.
Binary Aggregation via Delegable Proxy
In binary aggregation with proxy, agents either express an acceptance/rejection opinion or delegate such opinion to a different agent.
Proxy Opinions and Profiles
Let a BA structure A be given and assume for now that γ = , that is, all issues are logically independent. An opinion O : P → {0, 1} ∪ N is an assignment of either a truth value or another agent to each issue in P, such that O i (p) = i (that is, self-delegation is not an expressible opinion). We will later also require proxy opinion to be individually rational, in a precise sense (Section 3.2.2). For simplicity we are assuming that abstention is not a feasible opinion in proxy voting, but that is an assumption that can be easily lifted in what follows.
We call functions of the above kind proxy opinions to distinguish them from standard (binary) opinions, and we denote by P the set of all proxy opinions, P c the set of all consistent proxy opinions, P N being the set of all proxy profiles.
Delegation Graphs
Each profile O of proxy opinions (proxy profile in short) induces a delegation graph
The expression iR p j stands for "i delegates her vote to j on issue p". Each R p is a so-called functional relation. It corresponds to the graph of an endomap on N . So we will sometimes refer to the endomap r p : N → N of which R p is the graph. Relations R p have a very specific structure and can be thought of as a set of trees whose roots all belong to cycles (possibly loops).
The weight of an agent i w.r.t. p in a delegation graph G O is given by its indegree with respect to R * p (i.e., the transitive reflexive closure of R p ):
10 For all p ∈ P, we also define the function g p : N → ℘(N ) such that g p (i) = j ∈ N | jR * p i and k : jR p k . The function associates to each agent i (for a given issue p), the (singleton consisting of the) last agent reachable from i via a path of delegation on issue p, when it exists (and ∅ otherwise). Slightly abusing notation we will use g p (i) to denote an agent, that is, the guru of i over p when g
If the delegation graph G O of a proxy profile O is such that, for some R p , there exists no i ∈ N such that i is a guru of p, we say that graph G O (and profile O) is void on p. Intuitively, a void profile on p is a profile where no voter expresses an opinion on p, because every voter delegates her vote to somebody else.
Given a BA structure A, a proxy aggregation rule (or proxy aggregator) for A is a function pv : P N → O * that maps every proxy profile to one collective incomplete opinion. As above, pv(O)(p) denotes the outcome of the aggregation on issue p.
Proxy Aggregators
The most natural form of voting via delegable proxy is a proxy version of the majority rule we discussed in Section 2:
That is, an issue is accepted by proxy majority in profile O if the sum of the weights of the agents who accept p in O exceeds the majority quota, it is rejected if the sum of the weights of the agents who reject p in O exceeds the majority quota, and it is undecided otherwise. It should be clear that
(and similarly for ¬p), that is, the sum of the weights of the gurus accepting (rejecting) p is precisely the cardinality of the set of agents whose gurus accept (reject) p.
In general, it should be clear that for any quota rule F : O * c → O * a proxy variant pv F of F can be defined via an obvious adaptation of (6).
To fix intuitions further about proxy voting it is worth discussing another example of aggregator, proxy dictatorship. It is defined as follows, for a given d ∈ N (the dictator) any proxy profile O and issue p:
That is, in a proxy dictatorship, the collective opinion is the opinion of the guru of the dictator, when it exists, and it is undefined otherwise.
Two Problems of Delegable Proxy

Cycles and Abstention
It should be clear from the definition of proxy aggregators like pv maj , that such aggregators rely on the existence of gurus in the underlying delegation graphs.
If the delegation graph R p on issue p contains no guru, then the aggregator has access to no information in terms of who accepts and who rejects issue p. To avoid bias in favor of acceptance or rejection, such situations should therefore result in an undecided collective opinion. That is for instance the case of pv maj . However, such situations may well be considered problematic, and the natural question arises therefore of how likely they are, at least in principle.
Fact 2. If each delegation graph R p on p is equally probable, then the probability that R p has no gurus tends to 1 e as n tends to infinity. Proof. The claim amounts to computing the probability that a random functional graph R p has no gurus as n tends to infinity, or equivalently, that a random endomap r p : N → N has no fixpoints. Notice first of all that, for a given |N | = n, the probability that an agent is not a guru is n−1 n , and the probabiity that none of the agents is a guru (
n . The desired value is established through this series of equations:
This completes the proof. Now contrast this simple fact with the probability that all agents abstain on an issue in a binary aggregation with abstention context, which tends to 0 as n tends to infinity.
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Fact 2 should obviously not be considered a realistic estimate of the effect of cycles on abstention, and election data should rather be used for that purpose, possibly together with refinements of the analytical arguments that take into consideration a realistic network structure underpinning delegation graphs (e.g., a small world network). Nonetheless, Fact 2 does flag a potential problem of cyclical delegations as sources of abstention which has so far been ignored. In fact, this is the position on cyclical delegations reported in [2, Section 2.4.1]:
"The by far most discussed issue is the so-called circular delegation problem. What happens if the transitive delegations lead to a cycle, e.g. Alice delegates to Bob, Bob delegates to Chris, and Chris delegates to Alice? Would this lead to an infinite voting weight? Do we need to take special measures to prohibit such a situation? In fact, this is a nonexistent problem: A cycle only exists as long as there is no activity in the cycle in which case the cycle has no effect. As already explained [. . . ], as soon as somebody casts a vote, their (outgoing) delegation will be suspended. Therefore, the cycle naturally disappears before it is used. In our example: If Alice and Chris decide to vote, then Alice will no longer delegate to Bob, and Chris will no longer delegate to Alice [. . . ]. If only Alice decides to vote, then only Alice's delegation to Bob is suspended and Alice would use a voting weight of 3. In either case the cycle is automatically resolved and the total voting weight used is 3."
We will discuss later (Section 4) a possible approach to mitigate this issue by suggesting a different interpretation of liquid democracy in terms of influence rather than delegation.
Individual & Collective Rationality
In our discussion so far we have glossed over the issue of logically interdependent issues and collective rationality. The reason is that under the delegative interpretation of liquid democracy developed in this section individual rationality itself appears to be a more debatable requirement than it normally is in classical aggregation.
A proxy opinion O i is individually rational if the set of formulas
is satisfiable (consistency), and if whenever (8) entails ±p, then ±p belongs to it (closedness). 13 That is, the integrity constraint γ is consistent with i's opinion 12 But note also that Fact 2 states the probability of not having any gurus, assuming that all delegation graphs (and not the proxy profiles) are equally likely. For each possible delegation graph, there exists 2 m different opinion profiles, where m is the number of gurus in the graph. 13 Cf. the definition of individual opinions in Section 2.
on the issues she does not delegate on, and the opinions of her gurus (if they exist), and those opinions, taken together, are closed under logical consequence (w.r.t. the available issues). This seems highly counterintuitive under a delegative interpretation of proxy voting as i can not in principle know how her gurus are going to vote. So aggregation via delegable proxy has at least the potential to represent individual opinions as irrational (inconsistent and/or not logically closed).
Like in the case of delegation cycles we will claim that the interpretation of liquid democracy in terms of influence to be developed in Section ??, rather than in terms of delegation, makes individual rationality at least as defensible as in the classical case.
Embedding in Binary Aggregation with Abstentions
One man-One vote
Aggregation in liquid democracy as conceived in [2] should satisfy the principle that the opinion of every voter, whether expressed directly or through proxy, should be given the same weight: In other words, this principle suggests that aggregation via delegable proxy should actually be 'blind' for the specific type of delegation graph. Making this more formal, we can think of the above principle as suggesting that the only relevant content of a proxy profile is its translation into a standard opinion profile (with abstentions) via a function t : P → O * defined as follows: for any i ∈ N and p ∈ P:
, if i has a guru for p), and t(O i (p)) = * otherwise. Clearly, if we assume proxy profiles to be individually rational, the translation will map proxy opinions into individually rational (consistent and closed) incomplete opinions. By extension, we will denote by t(O) the incomplete opinion profile resulting from translating the individual opinions of a proxy profile O.
The above discussion suggests the definition of the following property of proxy aggregators: a proxy aggregator pv has the one man-one vote property (or is a one man-one vote aggregator) if and only if pv = t • F for some aggregator F : O * c → O * (assuming the individual rationality of proxy profiles). where (i, j) denotes the length
The class of one man-one vote aggregators can therefore be studied simply as the concatenation t • F where F is an aggregator for binary voting with abstentions, as depicted in the following diagram:
which gives us a handle to study a large class of proxy voting rules Example 5. Proxy majority pv maj (6) is clearly a one man-one vote rule aggregator. It is easy to check that, for any proxy profile O:
The same holds for proxy dictatorship (7). It is easy to see that proxy dictatorship pv d is such that for any proxy profile O:
It follows that for every proxy aggregator pv F = t • F the axiomatic machinery developed for standard aggregators can be directly tapped into. Characterization results then extend effortlessly to proxy voting, again providing a strong rationale for the use of majority in proxy aggregation:
Fact 3 (Characterization of proxy majority). A one man-one vote proxy aggregator pv = t • F for a given A is proxy majority pv maj iff F is anonymous, independent, monotonic, responsive, neutral and minimizes undecisiveness.
Proof. This follows from the definition of t and Theorem 1.
It follows that on simple agendas and assuming the individual rationality of proxy profiles, proxy majority is the only rational aggregator which is anonymous, independent, monotonic, responsive, neutral and minimizes undecisiveness.
Impossibility
Similarly, there are many ways in which pursue the opposite embedding, from standard aggregation into proxy voting. For example, we can define a function s : O c → P c from opinion profiles to individually rational proxy profiles as follows. For a given opinion profile O, and issue p ∈ P consider the set {i ∈ N | O i (p) = * } of individuals that abstain in O and take an enumeration 1, . . . , m of its elements, where m = | {i ∈ N | O i (p) = * } |. The function is defined as follows, for any i ∈ N and p ∈ P:
of the delegation path linking j to i. This definition of weight is such that the contribution of voters decreases as their distance from the guru increases. Aggregators of this type are studied in [5] . 
Section Summary
The section has provided a very simple model of delegable proxy voting within the framework of binary aggregation. This has allowed us to put liquid democracy in perspective with an established body of results in the social choice theory tradition, and highlight two of its problematic aspects, which have so far gone unnoticed: the effect of cycles on collective indecisiveness, and the issue of preservation of individual rationality under delegable proxies.
An independent, purpose-built axiomatic analysis for liquid democracy focused on its more characteristic features (like the one man-one vote property) is a natural line of research, which we do not pursue here.
Liquid Democracy as Opinion Diffusion
Proxy voting can also be studied from a different perspective. Imagine a group where, for each issue p, each agent copies the 0, 1 opinion of a unique personal "guru". Imagine that this group does so repeatedly until all agents (possibly) reach a stable opinion. These new stable opinions can then be aggregated as the 'true' opinions of the individuals in the group. The collective opinion of a group of agents who either express a 0, 1 opinion or delegate to another agent is (for a suitable class of proxy aggregators) is the same as the output obtained from a vote where each individual has to express a 0, 1 opinion but gets there by copying the opinion of some unique "guru" (possibly themselves). In this perspective, a proxy voting aggregation can be assimilated to a (converging) process of opinion formation.
This above interpretation of liquid democracy is explicitly supported in [2] :
"While one way to describe delegations is the transfer of voting weight to another person, you can alternatively think of delegations as automated copying of the ballot of a trustee. While at assemblies with voting by a show of hands it is naturally possible to copy the vote of other people, in Liquid Democracy this becomes an intended principle" [2, p. 22].
The current section develops an analysis of this interpretation, and highlights its advantages of the delegation-based one.
Binary aggregation and binary influence
The section develops a very simple model of binary influence based on the standard framework of binary aggregation (see Appendix B for a concise presentation). For simplicity, we assume agents are therefore not allowed to abstain, although this is not a crucial assumption for the development of our analysis.
DeGroot Processes and Opinion Diffusion
In [7] , DeGroot proposes a simple model of step-by-step opinion change under social influence. The model combines two types of matrices. Assuming a group of n agents, a first n × n matrix represents the weighted influence network (who influences whom and how much), and a second n × m matrix represents the probability assigned by each agent to each of the m different alternatives. Both the agents' opinion and the influence weights are taken within [0, 1] and are (row) stochastic (each row sums up to 1). Given an opinion and an influence matrix, the opinion of each agent in the next time step is obtained through linear averaging.
Here we focus on a specific class of opinion diffusion processes in which opinions are binary, and agents are influenced by exactly one influencer, possibly themselves, of which they copy the opinion. The model captures a class of processes which lies at the interface of two classes of diffusion models that have remained so far unrelated: the stochastic opinion diffusion model known as DeGroot's [7] , and the more recent propositional opinion diffusion model due to [13] . The diffusion processes underpinning liquid democracy-which we call here Boolean DeGroot processes (BDPs)-are the {0, 1} special case of the DeGroot stochastic processes and, at the same time, the special case of propositional opinion diffusion processes where each agent has access to the opinion of exactly one neighbor (cf. Figure 1 ).
Boolean DeGroot processes
Here we focus on the Boolean special case of a DeGroot process showing its relevance for the analysis of liquid democracy. Opinions are defined over a BA structure, and hence are taken to be binary. Similarly, we take influence to be modeled by the binary case of an influence matrix. Influence is of an "allor-nothing" type and each agent is therefore taken to be influenced by exactly
BDPs DeGroot Processes
Propositional Opinion Diffusion one agent, possibly itself. The graph induced by such a binary influence matrix (called influence graph) is therefore a structure G = N, R where R ⊆ N 2 is a binary relation where iRj is taken here to denote that "i is influenced by j". Such relation is serial (∀i ∈ N, ∃j ∈ N : iRj) and functional (∀i, j, k ∈ N if iRj and iRk then j = k). So each agent i has exactly one successor (the influencer), possibly itself, which we denote R(i). It should be clear that influence graphs are the same sort of structures we studied earlier in Section 3 under the label 'delegation graph'.
An influence profile G = (G 1 , . . . , G m ) records how each agent is influenced by each other agent, with respect to each issue p ∈ P. Given a profile G the i th projection G i denotes the influence graph for issue p i .
So let us define the type of opinion dynamics driving BDPs:
Definition 4 (BDP). Now fix an opinion profile O and an influence profile G.
Consider the stream
. . of opinion profiles recursively defined as follows:
We call processes defined by the above dynamics Boolean DeGroot processes (BDPs).
It should be clear that the above dynamics is the extreme case of linear averaging applied on binary opinions and binary influence.
As noted above, BDPs are also the special case of processes that have recently been proposed in the multi-agent systems literature as propositional opinion diffusion processes [13] , i.e., cases where 1) the aggregation rule is the unanimity rule (an agent adopts an opinion if and only if all her influencers agree on it), and 2) each agent has exactly one influencer. We will come back to the link with propositional opinion diffusion in some more detail later in Section 4.3.
Convergence of BDPs
When do the opinions of a group of individuals influencing each other stabilize? Conditions have been given, in the literature, for the general paradigms of which BDPs are limit cases. This section introduces the necessary graphtheoretic notions and briefly recalls those results before giving a characterization of convergence for BDPs.
Preliminaries
We start with some terminology. We say that the stream of opinion profiles
We will also say that a stream of opinion profiles converges for issue p if there exists n ∈ N such that, for all
. Given a stream of opinion profiles starting at O we say that agent i ∈ N stabilizes in that stream for issue p if there exists n ∈ N such that O Notice first of all that influence graphs have a special shape:
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Fact 5. Let G be an influence graph and C be a connected component of G. Then C contains exactly one cycle, and the set of nodes in the cycle is closed.
Proof. Assume that C does not contain any cycle. Since N is finite and since no path can repeat any node, any path in C is finite too. Let i be the last element of (one of) the longest path(s) in C. Then i does not have any successor, which contradicts seriality. So C contains at least one cycle. Let S be the set of nodes of a cycle in C. Assume that S is not closed: for some i ∈ S and j / ∈ S, iRj. Since S is a cycle, there is also some k ∈ S, such that iRk, which contradicts functionality. Therefore, the nodes of any cycle in C forms a closed set. Now assume that C contains more than one cycle. Since the nodes of each cycle forms a closed set, there is no path connecting any node inside a cycle to any node in any other cycle, which contradicts connectedness. So C contains a unique cycle, whose nodes form a closed set.
Intuitively, influence graphs of BDPs then look like sets of confluent chains aiming together towards common cycles.
Context: convergence in DeGroot processes
For the general case of DeGroot processes, an influence structure guarantees that any distribution of opinions will converge if and only if "every set of nodes that is strongly connected and closed is aperiodic" [18, p.233] . In the propositional opinion diffusion setting, sufficient conditions for stabilization have been given by [13, Th. 2] : on influence structures containing cycles of size at most one (i.e, only self-loops), for agents using an aggregation function satisfying (ballot-)monotonicity and unanimity 17 , opinions will always converge in at most at most k + 1 steps, where k is the diameter of the graph. 18 The results below show how BDPs are an interesting limit case of both DeGroot and propositional opinion diffusion processes.
Two results
It must be intuitively clear that non-convergence in a BDP is linked to the existence of cycles in the influence graphs. However, from the above observation (Fact 5), we know that nodes in a cycle cannot have any influencers outside this cycle, and hence that cycles (including self-loops) can only occur at the "tail" of the influence graph. Hence, if the opinions in the (unique) cycle do not converge, which can only happen in a cycle of length ≥ 2, the opinions of the whole population in the same connected component will not converge. The above implies that for any influence graphs with a cycle of length ≥ 2, there exists a distribution of opinions which loops. This brings us back to convergence result for general (not necessarily Boolean) DeGroot processes. Indeed, for functional and serial influence graphs, a closed connected component is aperiodic if and only if its cycle is of length 1. 2. For all p ∈ P, G p contains no cycle of length ≥ 2.
3. For all p ∈ P, all closed connected components of G p are aperiodic.
Proof. 2) ⇒ 1) Let p ∈ P and assume that G p contains no cycle of length ≥ 2 and has diameter k. Let C p be a connected component of G p . By Fact 5, C p contains a unique cycle, which, by assumption, is of length 1. Hence, C p is aperiodic. Let i be the node in the cycle. The opinion of i will spread to all nodes in C p after at most k steps. Therefore, all BDPs on G will converge after at most l steps, where l is the maximum within the set of diameters of G p for all p ∈ P. 1) ⇒ 3) We proceed by contraposition. Assume that for some p ∈ P, a connected component C p of G p contains a cycle of length k ≥ 2. By 5, this cycle is unique, and therefore the greatest common divisor of the cycles lengths of C p is k, so C p is not aperiodic. Let S be the set of nodes in the cycle. Let O be such that for some i, j ∈ S with distance d from i to j,
It is worth noticing that one direction (namely from 3 to 1) of the above result is actually a corollary of both the convergence result for DeGroot processes stated at the beginning of this section (cf. [18] ), and of a known convergence result for propositional opinion diffusion [13, Th. 2] , also stated earlier.
The above gives a characterization of the class of influence profiles on which all opinion streams converge. But we can aim at a more general result, characterizing the class of pairs of opinion and influence profiles which lead to convergence:
Theorem 3. Let G be an influence profile and O be an opinion profile. Then the following statements are equivalent:
2. For all p ∈ P, there is no set of agents S ⊆ N such that: S is a cycle in G p and there are two agents i, 
This trivially implies that the class of opinion profiles which guarantees convergence for any influence profile, is the one where everybody agrees on everything already. Note that the only stable distributions of opinions are the ones where, in each connected component in G, all members have the same opinion, i.e, on BDPs, converging and reaching a consensus (within each connected component) are equivalent, unlike in the stochastic case. Moreover, for an influence profile where influence graphs have at most diameter d and the smallest cycle in components with diameter d is of length c, it is easy to see that if a consensus is reached, it will be reached in at most d − c steps, which is at most n − 1.
Finally observe that Theorem 3 subsumes Fact 6. If G p contains only cycles of length 1 (second statement in Fact 6) then, trivially, no two agents in a cycle can disagree (second statement in Theorem 3).
Cycles
As discussed earlier (Section 3.2.1), cycles are a much discussed issue in liquid democracy. Its proponents tend to dismiss delegation cycles as a non-issue: since the agents forming a cycle delegate their votes, none of them is casting a ballot and the cycles get resolved essentially by not counting the opinions of the agents involved in the cycle [2] . We stressed this solution as problematic in the 'vote-delegation' interpretation of liquid democracy as it has the potential to discard large numbers of opinions. The elimination of cycles not only hides to aggregation the opinions of the agents involved in cycles, but also the opinions of agents that may be linked to any of those agents by a delegation path. In other words information about entire connected components in the delegation graph may be lost.
We argue that the 'vote-copying' interpretation of the system offers viable insights into better handling of cycles in delegable proxy. Theorems 3 and 6 offer an alternative solution by showing that not all cycles are necessarily bad news for convergence: cycles in which agents agree still support convergence of opinions, and therefore a feasible aggregation of opinions by proxy. This suggests that alternative proxy voting mechanisms could be designed based on opinion convergence results rather than weighted forms of voting by gurus.
Excursus: unanimity and 2-colorability
In the above, we have worked at the intersection of two models of opinion diffusion, the DeGroot model, and the propositional opinion diffusion model. However, there is more to say about how the two frameworks relate.
Let us take a brief detour towards a generalisation of BDPs corresponding to the case of propositional opinion diffusion with the unanimity rule, where agents can have several influencers and change their opinions only if all their influencers disagree with them. This means that we relax the functionality constraint on influence graphs. We will show how the two frameworks meet again: some nonstabilizing opinion cases under the unanimity rule correspond to a special class among the 'semi-Boolean' cases of DeGroot processes where opinions are still binary but influence does not need to be.
We define the dynamics of opinions under the unanimity rule in the obvious way:
Definition 5 (UP). Fix an opinion profile O and a (serial but non-necessarily functional) influence profile G.
Step: for all i ∈ N and all p ∈ P:
We call processes defined by the above dynamics Unanimity Processes (UPs).
We give a sufficient condition for non-convergence of UPs: Lemma 2. Let G be a (serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profile and O be an opinion profile, such that, for some p ∈ P, for all i, j ∈ C, where C is a connected component of
Proof. Let G be a (serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profile, and O be an opinion profile, such that, for some p ∈ P, for all i, j ∈ C with C a connected component of
Intuitively, the above condition for non-convergence corresponds to a situation of global maximal disagreement: all agents (of a connected component) disagree with all their influencers. Recall that a graph is properly k-colored if each node is assigned exactly one among k colors and no node has a successor of the same color, and consider the two possible opinions on issue p as colors. The above result can be reformulated in terms of proper 2 colorings, as follows: if for some p ∈ P, O properly colors G p , then O does not converge. In such a case, all agents will change their opinion on p at every step, entering an oscillation of size 2. So the maximal state of disagreement is the maximally unstable case of the dynamics. Note that this limit case of opinion distribution is yet another special case of DeGroot processes, another example within the intersection between the two frameworks of propositional opinion diffusion and DeGroot.
The possibility of such a distribution of opinions on p relies on the influence graph G p being 2-colorable, which is again a requirement about the lengths of its cycles: it is 2-colorable if and only if it contains no cycle of odd length. However, non 2-colorability is not a sufficient condition for convergence of UPs in general: a simple cycle of three agents, for instance, is not 2-colorable but does not guarantee convergence either (as illustrated above with the convergence conditions for BDPs). Nevertheless, there is a class of influence profiles for which being 2-colorable is a necessary condition of non-convergence of UPs, the symmetric ones:
Lemma 3. Let G be a symmetric (serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profile and O be an opinion profile. The following are equivalent:
This means that opinions on a given p will converge if and only if two agents influencing each other on p already agree on it. We can therefore, as we did for BDPs, characterize the class of influence profiles for which all (symmetric) opinion profiles converge in UPs:
Theorem 4. Let G be a symmetric (serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profile. The following are equivalent:
1. All opinion profiles O, converge in UPs on G.
2. For all p ∈ P, and all connected components of C ⊆ G p , C is not 2-colorable (contains cycle(s) of odd length).
Proof. 2) ⇒ 1) Let p ∈ P and C be connected component of G p with diameter k. Let C contain a cycle of length c, with c odd. Let O be an arbitrary opinion profile. Since c is odd, there exist i, j ∈ S such that j ∈ R p (i) and
By definition of UP, this implies that O i (p) is stable, and that all agents with distance ≤ k will be stable after at most k steps. Hence, O converges. 1) ⇒ 2) This follows from Lemma 3.
Note that, while the basic modal language cannot capture graph 2-colorability, it can capture non 2-colorability, and therefore capture the class of symmetric (serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profiles which guarantee convergence of UPs. We leave the detail out for space reason.
We have shown that, for UPs in general, convergence (in a connected component) is not guaranteed if it contains no odd cycles, and that symmetric UPs guarantee convergence as soon as they contain some odd cycle. However, containing an odd cycle is a very "easy" requirement for a real-life influence network to meet (it corresponds to a non-zero clustering coefficient). By contrast, recall that BDPs guarantee convergence (on any opinion profile) only when they contain only cycles of size 1, which is a rather implausible requirement to be satisfied on real influence networks.
BDPs on logically interdependent issues
So far we have assumed the aggregation to happen on a set of issues without constraint (or rather with γ = ). In this subsection we study what happens in the presence of a constraint γ = . BDPs on aggregation structures with constraints may lead individuals to update with logically inconsistent opinions. But the diffusion perspective whereby agents copy the opinion of trustees rather than delegating their voting right better lends itself to an assumption of individual rationality.
The following processes are simple adaptations of BDPs where agents update their opinions only if the opinions of their influencers, on the respective issues, are consistent with the constraint. • Base:
We call processes defined by the above dynamics individually rational BDPs.
Individually rational BDPs converge in some cases in which BDPs do not. There are cases in which there is disagreement in the cycles but the process still converges, because of the safeguard towards individual rationality built into the dynamics.
Example 6. Consider the following example. Let N = {1, 2}, P = {p, q} and γ = {p ↔ ¬q}. Let then G = N, {R i } i∈P be as follows:
Voters 1 and 2 form a non-unanimous cycle, but O is a stable opinion profile.
The example shows that direction 1) ⇒ 2) of Theorem 3 does not hold for individually rational BDPs: some individually rational BDPs may stabilize even in the presence of disagreement within a cycle. Intuitively, the reason why this happens is that individually rational BDPs that stabilize even when disagreements occur within cycles do so because their cycles are not "synchronized". In the above example, given the constraint p ↔ ¬q, the only way to get stabilization starting from a situation respecting the constraint is to have a cycle of influence for q which goes 'in the opposite direction' from the one from p, all other cases would amount to violate the constraint.
Beyond this simple example, we want to find out what happens with more complex constraints and what are the conditions for individually rational BDPs to converge. Let us first show that direction 2) ⇒ 1) of Theorem 3 still holds, that is, individually rational BDPs without disagreement in their cycles always converge:
Theorem 5. Let G be an influence profile, O be an opinion profile, and γ a constraint. Then the following holds: if for all p ∈ P, for all S ⊆ N such that S is a cycle in G p , and all i, j ∈ S: O i (p) = O j (p), then the individually rational BDP for O, G and γ converges in at most k steps, where k ≤ max{diam(G p )|p ∈ P }.
Proof. Assume that for all p ∈ P, for all S ⊆ N such that S is a cycle in G p , for all i, j ∈ S: O i (p) = O j (p). Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N . Let k i (p) be the distance from i to the closest agent in a cycle of G p , and let k i denote max{k i (p)|p ∈ P }. We show that for any k i ∈ N, O ki i is stable.
• If k i = 0: i is its only infuencer, therefore O 0 i is stable.
• If k i = n + 1: Assume that for all agents j such that k j = n, O kj j is stable. This implies that all influencers of i are stable. We need to consider the following cases:
Rp(i) (p) ∧ γ is not consistent, then it will never be: O n i is stable.
If
This completes the proof.
Section Summary
In this section we studied a very simple class of opinion diffusion processes on networks (Boolean DeGroot processes, BDPs), which precisely capture the votecopying behavior suggested by a standard interpretation of the liquid democracy system. Interestingly these processes lie at the interface of two so far unconnected network diffusion models: the well-known DeGroot processes-of which BDPs constitute the binary special case-and of propositional opinion diffusion processes-of which BDPs constitute the special case where the set of neighbors is a singleton. We established necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence, which can be captured in modal fixpoint logics as we will show in the next section. We argued that these results provide a novel angle on the issue of delegation cycles in liquid democracy.
There are a number of further questions concerning, especially, individually rational BDPs that we leave for future investigations: What are the necessary conditions for their stabilization? What opinions are reachable? And, in particular, when is a consensus reached? Finally, we could consider other types of influence policies than the one used in individually rational BDPs. For instance, agents may be allowed to 'pass through' an inconsistent state at some point, in which case we can wonder under which conditions they can still converge to a consistent state. Indeterministic policies would also make sense, where an agent confronted with inconsistent opinions from her influencers keeps one of the closest consistent opinions set, rather than not being influenced at all.
Fixpoint Logics for BDPs
In this section we show how a well-established logic for formal verification can be readily used to specify and reason about properties of BDPs, and in particular their convergence. The logic is the so-called µ-calculus. This points to a so-far unexplored interface between fixpoint logics and models of opinion dynamicslike the DeGroot model and propositional opinion diffusion. The section moves some first steps in that direction along the lines of another recent work [3] , where the mu-calculus, and extensions thereof, have been applied to the study of dynamical systems.
Influence graphs as Kripke models
We treat influence graphs as Kripke (multi-relational) models [20, 6] .
Definition 7.
We call an influence model a tuple M = N, G, O where G = (G p1 , . . . , G pm ) is an influence profile, and O : P −→ 2 N is an opinion profile over P, that is, a valuation function.
One can therefore easily interpret a modal language over influence models, where modalities are interpreted on the accessibility relations in G. That is, to each graph G p we associate modalities [p] and p . We will give the details below, but let us immediately note that the class of (possibly infinite) influence graphs would then be characterized by the following properties, for any p ∈ P:
More precisely, for any influence profile
is valid in such graph-that is, true in any pointed influence model built on such graph-if and only if each G pi consists of a serial (respectively, functional) relation. 19 Put otherwise, on serial and functional graphs the modal box and diamond are equivalent.
Modal µ-calculus
The language of the µ-calculus expands the basic modal language with a least fixpoint operator µ. Here is the BNF of the language:
where p ranges over P and ϕ(p) indicates that p occurs free in ϕ (i.e., it is not bounded by fixpoint operators) and under an even number of negations.
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In general, the notation ϕ(ψ) stands for ψ occurs in ϕ. The usual definitions for Boolean and modal operators apply. Intuitively, µp.ϕ(p) denotes the smallest formula p such that p ↔ ϕ(p). The greatest fixpoint operator ν can be defined from µ as follows: νp.ϕ(p) := ¬µp.¬ϕ(¬p).
We interpret L µ on influence models as follows:
The satisfaction of ϕ by a pointed influence model (M, i) is inductively defined as follows:
where ϕ M[p:=X] denotes the truth-set of ϕ once O(p) is set to be X. As usual, we say that: ϕ is valid in a model M iff it is satisfied in all points of M, i.e., M |= ϕ; ϕ is valid in a class of models iff it is valid in all the models in the class.
We list some relevant known results about K µ . The logic has a sound and (weakly) complete axiom system [26] . The satisfiability problem of K µ is decidable [24] . The complexity of the model-checking problem for K µ is known to be in NP ∩ co-NP [17] . It is known that the model-checking problem for a formula of size m and alternation depth d on a system of size n can be solved by the natural fixpoint-approximation algorithm with (time) complexity of O((m · n) d+1 ) [10] , where the alternation depth of a formula of L µ is the maximum number of µ/ν alternations in a chain of nested fixpoint subformulas. 21 Finally, the µ-calculus is known to be invariant for bisimulation (cf. [4] ). It actually corresponds to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of monadic second-order logic [19] . 
On the logic of convergence in BDPs
That is, the interpretation of p at step n + 1 is the interpretation of [p] p at step n. Equivalently, the interpretation of ¬p at step n + 1 is the interpretation of [p] ¬p at step n.
Lemma 4. Let M = N, G, O be an influence model. The two following statements are equivalent:
2. The pointed model (M, i) satisfies: It follows that i is connected through a finite G p -path to an agent j such that M, j |= stb(p). By Lemma 4 j is therefore stable and therefore i will stabilize for p.
So the formula that expresses the stabilization of the agents' opinions on one issue is µx. (νy. ± p ∧ [p] y) ∨ [p] x. Informally, the theorem states that in a BDP an agent reaches a stable opinion if and only if it has an indirect influencer (linked by an influence path) whose all direct and indirect influencer have the same opinion. Notice that such formula has alternation depth 0. So an off-theshelf model-checking algorithm for the µ-calculus can check stabilization in time O(m · n) with n being the size of the model and m the size of the formula. Now confront this with the earlier Theorem 6. Since the convergence of the BDP is equivalent to the stabilization of all agents on all issues p (either on p or ¬p), we have the following corollary: 
for any agent i ∈ N , where U denotes the universal modality (cf. [4] ).
So we end up with a natural formalization of the property of convergence for a BDP.
Conclusions
The paper has moved the first steps towards the development of theoretical foundations for liquid democracy and related systems based on delegable proxy.
We have pursued two lines of research linked to two interpretations commonly associated to the proxy character of liquid democracy: the delegation of voting right to trustees, vs. the copying of the votes of influencers. The first interpretation has led us to develop a simple model of liquid democracy based on the theory of binary and judgment aggregation. This has allowed us to study liquid democracy as a form of binary aggregation with abstentions. The second interpretation has led us to study liquid democracy through extremely simple models of opinion diffusion corresponding to the Boolean special case of the stochastic processes of opinion diffusion known as DeGroot processes. We have argued that studying aggregation in liquid democracy through this lens offers important advantages with respect to the handling of delegation cycles and the preservation of individual rationality. Through this second perspective we have also shown how off-the-shelf logical techniques can be used to analyze properties (such as convergence) of the diffusion process underpinning liquid democracy.
An opinion O : P → {0, 1} is an assignment of truth values to the set of issues P, and the set of all opinions is denoted by O. The opinion of an agent i is said to be "consistent" whenever O i |= γ, that is, i's opinion satisfies the integrity constraint. The set of all consistent opinions is denoted O c = {O ∈ O | O |= γ}. Thus, O(p) = 0 (respectively, O(p) = 1) indicates that opinion O rejects (respectively, accepts) the issue p. Syntactically, the two opinions correspond to the truth of the literals p or ¬p. For p ∈ P we write ±p to denote one element from {p, ¬p}. 
It is well-known that aggregation by majority does not preserve consistency. The standard example is provided by the discursive dilemma, represented by the BA structure {1, 2, 3} , {p, q, r} , r ↔ p ∧ q . The profile consisting of O 1 |= p ∧ q ∧ r, O 2 |= p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r, O 3 |= ¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬r, returns an inconsistent majority opinion maj(O) |= p ∧ q ∧ ¬r.
B Relevant terminology from graph theory
Let G = N, R be a graph and R * be the transitive and symmetric closure of R. A path is a sequence of nodes i 1 , . . . , i k , such that, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i l Ri l+1 . The distance between two nodes i, j is the length of the shortest path i, . . . , j between them. The diameter of a graph is the maximal distance between any two nodes related by a path. A cycle is a path of length k such that i 1 = i k . A set of nodes S ⊆ N is said to be:
a cycle in G if all elements in S are in one cycle of length |S|, connected if for any i, j ∈ S: iR * j, strongly connected if for any i, j ∈ S: there is a path i, . . . , j , closed if for any i ∈ S, j / ∈ S, it is not the case that iRj, a connected component if for any i, j ∈ N : iR * j if and only if i, j ∈ S, aperiodic if the greatest common divisor of the lengths of its cycles is 1.
